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PREFACE 
Scientific knowledge, evolved from environmental psychology and other 
disciplines, indicates clearly that people can take care of the environment with 
good results under some conditions. On the other hand, science also reveals 
some of the obstacles related to the fact that people are people.  
How humans think and act regarding environmental problems has been 
studied in various contexts. These studies are not only interesting to reflect on, 
but can also form the basis of scientific knowledge to be used by authorities, 
managers and others with an interest in improving their environmental status.  
For those of us wanting to improve the environmental status of the various 
basins, estuaries or coastal areas of the Baltic Sea, knowledge and tools are 
both valuable and necessary. The Swedish Institute of the Marine Environment 
has asked Anders Biel, Professor at the Department of Psychology, University 
of Gothenburg, to synthesise the scientific knowledge gained from social 
dilemma research on how to handle common properties in cooperation with 
other people, regions and nations. This may concern how to handle nutrients, 
quantities, when and what to fish, and other activities on land and at sea.  
Anders Biel is the author of this report and takes responsibility for the 
recommendations provided. At the Swedish Institute of the Marine 
Environment, we hope that the report will be useful for personal reflections, as 
a basis for discussion among stakeholders, and as a contribution to the joint 
drive to work together to improve the marine environmental status.  
 
Eva-Lotta Sundblad 
Scientific Coordinator,	  Swedish Institute for the Marine Environment 
Gothenburg, September 1, 2015 
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FÖRORD 
Under vissa förutsättningar kan vi människor ta hand om miljön och ansvara 
för att den bevaras. Det finns tydliga resultat från forskning inom 
miljöpsykologi och andra discipliner som indikerar det. Samtidigt visar 
vetenskap och forskning också på några av de hinder som finns för att vi ska 
agera miljövänligt och som hänger ihop med vår mänskliga natur.  
Hur människor tänker och agerar avseende miljöproblem har studerats i olika 
sammanhang. Studierna är inte bara intressanta att reflektera över, utan kan 
också utgöra en bas av vetenskaplig kunskap som kan användas av 
myndigheter, beslutsfattare och andra som arbetar för att tillståndet i havet ska 
förbättras.  
För att uppnå en bättre miljö i Östersjön, är kunskap och verktyg både 
värdefulla och nödvändiga. Havsmiljöinstitutet har gett i uppdrag till Anders 
Biel, professor på Psykologiska institutionen vid Göteborgs universitet, att göra 
en syntes över den kunskap som kommit fram genom forskningen kring sociala 
dilemman och användningen av kollektiva nyttigheter. Syftet är att belysa hur 
man bör agera för att förvalta gemensam egendom i samarbete med andra 
människor, regioner och nationer. För Östersjön kan det bland annat handla 
om hur man ska ta hand om näringsämnen, när, vad och hur mycket som ska 
fiskas, samt andra aktiviteter på land och på sjön.  
Anders Biel är författare av rapporten och ansvarar för dess innehåll och de 
rekommendationer som ges. På Havsmiljöinstitutet hoppas vi att rapporten 
kommer att användas, såväl för personlig reflektion som för diskussioner 
mellan olika intressenter och beslutsfattare, samt även som ett bidrag till det 
gemensamma arbetet för att åstadkomma en bättre miljö i havet.  
 
Eva-Lotta Sundblad,  
Vetenskaplig koordinator vid Havsmiljöinstitutet 
Göteborg, 1 september 2015 
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SVENSK SAMMANFATTNING 
Östersjön är till nytta och glädje för många och berör många länder. Det är en 
gemensam tillgång som utsätts för utsläpp och nedskräpning. Därför är både 
samarbete och förvaltning nödvändigt, även om det är svårt i praktiken. Inom 
Helcom samarbetar olika länder för att lösa miljöproblemen i Östersjön. Bland 
annat görs statusbedömningar angående övergödningen, vilken till stor del 
orsakas av mänsklig aktivitet. Dilemman uppstår för olika aktörer då de i sin 
vardag och andra situationer ska besluta om vad de ska prioritera eller välja; 
egen vinning i närtid, eller gemensam nytta. Detta sker på många nivåer i 
samhället: lokalt, nationellt, och internationellt.  
Sociala dilemman uppstår då beslut ska tas av fler än två parter, där effekterna 
av besluten även påverkar många andra. Parterna agerar ofta anonymt, och det 
är alltså inte allmänt känt vad var och en gör. Forskning om sociala dilemman 
och om handlande för gemensam nytta har identifierat faktorer som stödjer 
eller hindrar samarbete. Det är såväl experiment som fältstudier. I denna 
rapport görs en genomgång av relevanta studier kring storskaliga dilemman. 
Syftet med rapporten är ge råd baserade på dessa studier.  
Experimentella studier visar under vilka förutsättningar människor är beredda 
att prioritera den gemensamma nyttan. En faktor som har uppmärksammats 
på individnivå är att människor antingen kan vara mer motiverad av att gynna 
sig själva, eller av att gynna det gemensamma. En annan faktor som särskiljer 
individer är vilka värden som de bejakar. Olika värden kan vara mer eller 
mindre starka och kan på olika sätt vägleda vilka beslut människor tar. Hit hör 
exempelvis miljövärden, vilka har betydelse för miljörelaterade handlingar. 
Det finns också faktorer i situationen som påverkar i vilken omfattning 
individer väljer att samarbeta. Tre situationsfaktorer nämns här: Det ena är 
effekten av belöningar och straff, men där slutsatsen ännu är oklar. Det andra 
är kommunikationen mellan parterna, vilken har visat sig vara bra för 
miljömässigt beteende. Det tredje är ”framing”, det vill säga hur man beskriver 
situationen. Genom att till exempel beskriva en valsituation i ekonomiska 
termer stöds egoistiska motiv, medan samarbete understöds om situationen 
beskrivs i rättvisetermer. 
 Osäkerhet är ofta betydande i storskaliga dilemman. Man vet kanske inte hur 
stor resursen är, vad andra gör, eller vad konsekvenserna blir av ens eget 
handlande. Ytterligare ett bidrag till osäkerhet är att konsekvenserna av ett 
handlande ofta infaller mycket senare än själva handlingen, och dessutom inte 
sällan på en annan plats. I den brist på kunskap som finns bedömer människor 
resursens tillstånd väl optimistiskt, vilket leder till överutnyttjande.  
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Resultat från naturligt förekommande dilemman visar också att kunskap och 
förståelse är viktiga. Kunskap är till nytta när övervakning, tillsyn och 
sanktioner behöver användas, då det är lättare att acceptera sådana styrmedel 
om det finns kunskap om situationens allvar. 
Enbart kunskap om sakernas tillstånd räcker dock inte för att människor skall 
samverka. Normer kan vara det kitt som gör att människor själva kan 
upprätthålla samarbete. Normer anvisar hur man kan agera och vad man bör 
göra. Andra omständigheter som visat sig underlätta samarbete är program för 
övervakning av resursen, kommunikation, och att obehöriga inte kan nyttja 
resursen. 
Huruvida det är fördelaktigt att den gemensamma tillgången, till exempel ett 
hav, sköts av privata aktörer eller av en gemensam förvaltning beror på flera 
aspekter. Till dessa hör hur stor den gemensamma tillgången är (jämför en 
insjö med ett hav), hur komplext det är att förstå, hur tillståndet för den 
gemensamma tillgången utvecklas, och i vilken mån den är kommersiellt 
exploaterbar. 
Även den tillit man har till andra personer i sin omgivning samt tilliten till 
aktörer på andra nivåer i samhället är viktigt för samarbetet.  
Rapportens författare, Anders Biel, drar utifrån studierna följande slutsatser av 
relevans för hanteringen av övergödningen i Östersjön:  
En viktig faktor är kunskap om dilemmats natur. Om människor har kunskap 
om problemens art, finns möjlighet att få till stånd en samverkan. Vad gäller 
Östersjön har bland andra Helcom bidragit till att informera om miljöns 
tillstånd. Det verkar därför rimligt att anta att det finns en utbredd kunskap om 
de akuta miljöproblemen, och även vad de orsakas av. Detta har i sin tur 
resulterat i nationella planer och åtaganden för vad som behöver göras, vilka 
tyvärr alla inte levt upp till.  
Sociala normer kan vara vägledande för hur människor kan agera genom att  
beskriva vad folk i allmänhet gör. Sociala normer kan också vara av moralisk 
art, påbjudande, och uttrycka vad människor bör göra i en given situation. Om 
en part avviker från en påbjudande norm kan det leda till att omgivningen 
bestraffar beteendet.  
Länderna kring Östersjön lever inte alltid upp till sina åtaganden för att minska 
övergödningen. Myndigheter bör med eftertryck se till att åtaganden följs för 
att såväl de beskrivande som påbjudande normer ska bidra till samarbetet. Då 
skulle också tilliten till andra parter och aktörer upprätthållas. Även tilliten 
mellan olika länder kan då fungera, så kallad horisontell tillit. Även den så 
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kallade vertikala tilliten, alltså förtroendet mellan myndigheter och aktörer på 
lägre nivå, exempelvis inom jordbruket, behöver stärkas. Om myndigheter 
menar allvar med sina åtaganden, är aktörer på lägre nivå beredda att 
anstränga sig. 
Parallellt kan nya styrmedel behövas som är riktade mot industrier eller 
sektorer som starkt bidrar till övergödning. Vad som också bör beaktas är arten 
av styrmedel. Styrmedel skall vara anpassa efter vad som bör göras, och till 
långsiktiga åtaganden. Rena marknadslösningar, såsom handel med 
utsläppsrätter leder uppmärksamhet till ekonomiskt tänkande vilket dessvärre 
uppmuntrar egennyttan snarare än den gemensamma nytta. Det är istället av 
vikt att fokusera på en framtida och gemensam målbild. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Baltic Sea – a shared responsibility 
The Baltic Sea is one of the largest brackish seas on Earth. Its enclosed nature 
makes it vulnerable to pollution. However, there is an inflow of fresh water 
from many rivers and an essential inflow of seawater into the Baltic Sea. 
Several polluters that affect the status of the Baltic Sea have been identified. 
Among these are both point sources, such as municipal wastewater treatment 
plants, industries and fish farms, and also diffuse sources, such as losses from 
agriculture and forestry. These problems are aggravated by the presence of 
heavy metals. 
Activities in many countries contribute to these environmental problems. Nine 
countries have a coastline facing the Baltic Sea. Another six countries have 
activities that also affect the catchment area. Thus, to get to grips with these 
problems, strategies that involve several countries are called for. In order to 
meet this requirement, HELCOM (the Helsinki Commission) was established. 
It is the governing body of the Helsinki Convention, which was first signed in 
1974 to protect the marine area of the Baltic Sea. HELCOM works to protect 
the marine environment of the Baltic Sea from all sources of pollution through 
intergovernmental cooperation between the nine coastline countries: 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia and 
Sweden, and also the European Community. 
In 1979 a status assessment was carried out, and was based on the monitoring 
of the Baltic Sea undertaken jointly by all of the contracting parties. 
Eutrophication was identified as an environmental problem, considered partly 
to be caused by human activities. Subsequent assessments recognised that 
nutrients in runoff from arable land may have been a significant source of 
eutrophication. With its Baltic Sea Action Plan (BSAP1) in 2007, HELCOM 
proposed maximum allowable loads of nutrients, phosphorus and nitrogen, 
per sub-basin in the Baltic Sea; reductions required to reduce eutrophication to 
a target level that would correspond to a good ecological and environmental 
status by the year 2021; and per-country, per-year nutrient load reductions to 
reach the target level.  
                                                
 
1 Besides BSAP, there are directives, mainly at European level, that address water pollution. These 
directives will be commented on only where they have implications for policy issues relating to 
eutrophication. 
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Map of the Baltic Sea region, according to the Helcom definition. The light green 
area represents the catchment area of the Baltic Sea. Map from Helcom. 
The Baltic Sea – a common good 
The Baltic Sea represents a common good, shared by several countries, and 
benefits many users. In order to manage this common good over time, 
cooperation between stakeholders is essential. Still, maintaining cooperation is 
not an easy task. Countries may agree that the inflow of nutrients into the 
Baltic Sea must be reduced, and by how much. However, a single country may 
try to limit its share of the reduction, hoping that other countries will take on a 
larger burden. The countries are facing a dilemma, where governments in each 
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country may be tempted to act for their own good (known as defection) rather 
than cooperating for the common good. Similarly, farmers may face a 
dilemma. Thus, every single farmer may be tempted to use nitrogen fertilisers 
extensively, thereby increasing his own short-term benefits, while at the same 
time contributing to negative impacts in the Baltic Sea. 
As this example shows, governing the Baltic Sea involves actors at different 
levels, and designing effective institutions that promote cooperation across 
many parties is a difficult and complex task. Research on social dilemmas and 
collective action has identified several factors that promote or prevent 
cooperation. One should bear in mind that the bulk of this research has been 
carried out as experiments in the laboratory. In these experiments, the 
participants are mostly students, not politicians, fishermen or others that are 
involved in naturally occurring dilemmas. Although valuable to them, the 
resource available to participants is generally money and not an environmental 
common good. However, findings from the experimental studies reported here 
are directly adaptable to real-life dilemmas, although not easily implemented 
in large-scale2, real-life dilemmas.  
The aim of this report is to give advice to the actors involved in marine social 
dilemmas, based on scientific knowledge. The following exposé presents a 
selected review of experimental research that is relevant to large-scale 
dilemmas, complemented by studies of real-life dilemmas in the marine 
environment. Findings from these two fields of research will be compared. 
Where the findings overlap, more valid conclusions that can be drawn about 
the factors that promote cooperation are described. Finally, some guidelines 
for reducing eutrophication in the Baltic Sea are proposed. But before the 
experimental research is reviewed, the structure of a social dilemma is 
presented. 
2. THE DILEMMA STRUCTURE 
From time to time, people must choose between promoting their personal 
interests and benefitting collective interests. Such conflicts have been termed 
social dilemmas (Dawes, 1980). Some would argue that human beings are 
motivated only by individual or egoistic concerns (e.g. Hardin, 1968), while 
others would claim that people carry with them a mixed bag of motives (e.g. 
Caporael et al., 1989; Etzioni, 1988). This conflict between individual and 
                                                
 
2 In contrast to local dilemmas or dilemma studies in the laboratory, large-scale dilemmas concern 
situations where action choices are made by people in collectives that are weakly united and where 
individuals are geographically separated. 
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collective interests has been highlighted in two well-known anecdotes: the 
prisoner’s dilemma and the tragedy of the commons. Although the prisoner’s 
dilemma does not have direct relevance for explaining behaviour in a social 
dilemma, it is presented in some detail as it is often referred to in the context of 
social dilemmas.  
Prisoner’s dilemma 
The prisoner’s dilemma (Flood, 1958) describes a situation where two 
prisoners, independent of each other, are asked to confess to or deny a 
potential crime. Should one of them confess, and the other deny, the confessor 
has his sentence reduced while the denier receives the harshest punishment. 
Should both confess, the confession is rewarded with a smaller reduction than 
if only one of them confesses, while if both deny they are better off than if they 
confess, but worse off than if you are a single confessor. Hence, from an 
individual point of view, confession is the dominant strategy. No matter what 
the other prisoner decides to do, confession results in a better outcome for the 
individual. However, this is not true at collective level. If both prisoners deny 
that they committed the crime, they are better off than if they both confess. 
One should bear in mind that the prisoner’s dilemma applies to a situation 
where only two parties are involved. In this dilemma, and as pointed out by 
Dawes (1980), the negative effects of the egoistic choice fall completely upon 
the other party. Moreover, both know with certainty the choice of the other 
party. Hence, each party can punish the other for defection, as prisoners 
sometimes do, or reward the other for cooperation. 
Social dilemma 
A social dilemma, on the other hand, incorporates decisions from more than 
two people or parties, and often from many more. This turns a social dilemma 
into a different dilemma to the prisoner’s dilemma. Thus, results from research 
on the prisoner’s dilemma cannot be applied to social dilemmas. In a social 
dilemma, the effects and harm of an egoistic choice are distributed between 
many others. Furthermore, people in a social dilemma often act anonymously. 
As a result, those affected may not know who caused the negative effects. For 
example, should a factory choose not to clean its foul water, people 
downstream will be affected and will perhaps be unaware of what caused the 
problem. Moreover, future costs for cleaning are passed on to other parties. 
Another example concerns fish. Each fisherman faces a decision about how 
many fish to catch. The stock of fish can be sustained, provided enough 
fishermen exercise restraint. However, if just one or just a few fishermen limit 
their catch, the stock may collapse and their restraint would be of no help. The 
second anecdote highlights decisions in a social dilemma. “The tragedy of the 
commons” was depicted by Garret Hardin as a dilemma where a herdsman 
comes to the rational conclusion that the positive utility of having an 
additional sheep on the commons is greater than the negative effects of the 
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increment of the total number of animals grazing on the same commons. The 
tragedy is that all rational herdsmen sharing the commons come to the same 
conclusion, adding more and more animals to the commons, ending as Hardin 
described it: “Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all” (Hardin, 1968 p. 
1244). 
 
 
Fishingboat in Rönnäng, Sweden. Photo: Shutterstock. 
 
Hardin’s rather bleak view of human nature has been questioned by research. 
According to Hardin, human beings are interested only, or primarily, in their 
own private benefits. Others have argued that people carry with them a mixed 
bag of motives. Some individuals are more likely than others to help others or 
forsake their own good for the benefit of nature. More importantly, most 
people can sometimes stand up for the common good, provided that the 
circumstances are right. Circumstances that affect behaviour in social 
dilemmas are often referred to as situational. The following examines 
experimental research on dilemmas that addresses individual and situational 
factors of potential importance for behaviour in environmental dilemmas, and 
is followed by field studies of naturally occurring dilemmas in marine 
environments. 
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3. EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH 
Research on social dilemmas has contributed mainly to knowledge about the 
conditions or circumstances under which people are prepared to prioritise the 
common good over their own private interests. Such knowledge is often 
presented in terms of individual and situational factors (e.g. Biel & Thøgersen, 
2007; Messick & Brewer, 1983). 
3.1. INDIVIDUAL FACTORS THAT AFFECT COOPERATION 
 
Social value orientation  
Among individual factors, social value orientation has received most attention. 
Social value orientation concerns people’s motives in social dilemmas and can 
broadly be divided into pro-self motives (individual or egoistic) and pro-social 
motives (cooperative or altruistic). When people are guided by pro-self motives 
their main concern is how they themselves are affected by various choices in a 
social dilemma: “Were our country to decide to reduce discharges and losses of 
nitrogen by 50%, how would that affect our agriculture and, ultimately, our 
economy?” On the other hand, when pro-social motives guide their actions, 
they view the dilemma from a moral perspective and show concern for other 
people or the common good (Liebrand et al., 1986): “Were our country to 
decide to reduce discharges and losses of nitrogen by 50%, how would that 
affect the future condition of the Baltic Sea?” According to researchers working 
with social value orientation (see, e.g. McClintock & Liebrand, 1988), social 
value orientation is part of people’s personality.  This implies that a person’s 
value orientation will be stable over time and across situations. Some research 
also supports that in real-life pro-socials cooperate to a greater extent than pro-
selves. For example, they commute more by public transport and less by 
private car than pro-selves (van Vugt et al., 1995).  
Value system 
Expressed in a somewhat different terminology, people may also vary in terms 
of which values they subscribe to. Values are cognitive representations of 
abstract goals in a person’s life (e.g. equality, a world at peace, protecting the 
environment, social power, ambition). Values transcend situations, guide 
people’s behaviour and vary in importance (Schwartz, 1992). Some of these 
values (e.g. equality, a world at peace) correspond to a pro-social orientation, 
while others (e.g. social power, ambition) are compatible with a pro-self 
orientation. Typically, if people adhere to one pro-social value they are likely to 
adhere to other values of the same kind and also less likely to have pro-self 
values. Thus, one may speak of differences in value system between individuals, 
organisations and cultures. In the latter case, dominant political ideologies may 
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determine which values decision makers adhere to. A common finding is that 
pro-social values are positively associated with pro-environmental behaviour 
(e.g. Stern et al., 1999). 
Stability versus variability  
A noticeable difference between social value orientation and a value system 
concerns the implicit assumption about how easily influenced each is by 
situational factors. Variations in social value orientation are assumed to reflect 
personality characteristics, which in turn are expected to be stable over time. 
This implies that there is limited room for external influence and behavioural 
change. On the other hand, although value systems are assumed to have some 
stability over time, research stresses that the situation that people are in largely 
determines the values that are likely to guide their behaviour. For example, 
Messick (1999) emphasised the importance of social aspects for behaviour in 
social dilemmas. The perceived appropriateness in a situation and the rules 
that guide behaviour are social elements. People often ask themselves: “What 
kind of situation is this?” If the situation is perceived as a collective problem, it 
is more likely that the social aspects of one’s identity are evoked than if the 
situation is perceived as a personal problem. Such social aspects can refer to 
pro-social motives, while personal aspects are more likely to evoke pro-self 
motives. This view of human behaviour is in line with the assumption that 
people carry with them a mixed bag of motives. In addition, other studies show 
that the way in which people perceive a situation can be influenced by how the 
situation is described. Hence, individual differences should not be over-
emphasised. Rather, behaviour in social dilemmas is to a large extent influenced 
by situational factors. For example, when the economy in a country is strong, 
politicians may be more likely to emphasise environmental values over 
economic achievements, while the reverse may be true when the economy is 
perceived as weak.  
3.2. SITUATIONAL FACTORS THAT AFFECT COOPERATION 
Three situational factors that have been addressed in experimental research 
could be of particular importance for cooperation in large-scale dilemmas. 
These are rewards and punishment, communication between the actors in the 
dilemma, and how the dilemma is described or framed. 
Rewards and punishments 
Rewards and punishments are external means of influencing people’s 
behaviour in a desirable direction. A common assumption is that the greater 
the reward or the punishment, the more likely people are to cooperate. 
However, this assumption may be questioned. An initial remark is that rewards 
and punishments come at a cost – a cost that may exceed potential benefits. 
Take the phenomenon of crime as an example. Most people do not commit 
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crimes. Their conscience tells them not to, and so do social norms about 
appropriate behaviour. Still, some do. Should the police authority be provided 
with more resources in the hope that the crime rate will decrease, or could the 
money be used more efficiently to turn some people into lawful citizens? A 
second remark is that the effect of rewards and punishments is not linear. It is 
simply not the case that an extra monetary reward always increases the 
likelihood of cooperation; it may even back-fire. A third remark is that 
monetary rewards lead people to defect and preclude attention to, and 
knowledge about, other utilities such as moral and social norms (Dawes, 
1980). Hence, people concentrate on the individual benefits and drawbacks of 
their behaviour rather than focusing on the social and moral aspects (see page 
16 under Framing). In short, they turn the social dilemma into an individual 
dilemma. Pro-self rather than pro-social motives will guide behaviour. 
Presently, too little is known about the potential costs and benefits of coercion 
and rewards in social dilemmas. This is not to say that rewards and 
punishments should not be used, only that more research is required to 
establish the conditions under which such policy instruments are more or less 
effective. 
Communication 
Communication is an important factor for promoting cooperation in social 
dilemmas. Communication increases cooperation for many reasons, including 
mutual commitments about appropriate behaviour, the development of a 
group identity and the reinforcement of prior norms, increased trust and 
positive expectations of others´ cooperative behaviour (Orbell et al., 1988). 
Group identity makes the social aspects of the situation salient (e.g. Gächter & 
Fehr, 1999). Once people make commitments, they tend to honour them. For 
one thing, commitment may impact on an individual’s trust in others sticking 
to their commitments (Ostrom, 1998). Moreover, even if people make their 
commitments anonymously they follow through (Kerr et al., 1997). Most 
likely, commitments evoke an internalised or personal norm that commitments 
should be honoured. 
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Once people make commitments, they tend to honour them. Photo: Shutterstock. 
 
Negotiation processes provide an illustration of part of these mechanisms, and 
of the importance of how discussions are conducted. For example, President 
Carter of the USA established peace negotiations between the Egyptian 
president Anwar Sadat and the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin at a 
meeting at Camp David in Maryland, USA. One important ingredient was to 
get the two parties away from the pressure exerted by the press, and from their 
own political constituencies. Hence, established identities and loyalties were 
weakened. This in itself was certainly not enough to come to an agreement. 
Negotiations went on for months and reached a deadlock. Eventually, one of 
the negotiators showed a picture of his grandson. A group identity, 
grandfather, was established. This identity in turn was associated with what a 
grandfather should do, namely make the world a better one for his 
grandchildren. Commitments were made (although, sadly, not honoured by 
followers). 
In local dilemmas, face-to-face communication is a natural ingredient in 
managing the commons. In large-scale dilemmas, where the actors are 
geographically spread out, it is not easily established. Since face-to-face 
communication between actors in large-scale dilemmas does not evolve 
naturally, it is important to create arrangements or institutions where groups 
of actors can meet. At the same time, their common goals should be defined 
and emphasised.  
Framing 
How options, outcomes and actions are described or framed could affect 
cooperation rates. Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) studied how framing 
influenced the acceptance of the construction of a repository for spent nuclear 
fuel in Switzerland. Four municipalities had been singled out as promising 
candidates. Inhabitants participated in a survey and just over 50% were willing 
to accept a repository in their municipality. In a second wave, they were 
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offered an additional financial payment to cover potential drawbacks. The 
payment varied between 1.6 and 4.8 thousand euros annually. If anything, 
willingness to accept should increase with the additional payment. As a matter 
of fact, the acceptance rate dropped to 25%, irrespective of the size of the sum. 
Why? The introduction of a payment evoked a new decision frame. Previously, 
acceptance was based on the importance of fair decision processes and 
considerations about societal utilities. Once a payment was introduced, 
individual gains and losses came into play. Rather than thinking about, and 
accepting, a fair procedure for the construction of the repository, respondents 
started to dwell on the personal risks associated with a repository and the 
potential decrease in the value of their homes. 
In a similar vein, Tenbrunsel and Messick (1999) had two groups of role-
playing managers that were asked by their company to allocate their budget to 
running scrubbers that would reduce emissions of a toxic gas. If the managers 
ran their scrubber 80% of the time on average, the company would reach its 
goal of reducing its emissions. In one of the groups a weak sanctioning system 
was introduced. If they as managers did not comply with the company’s policy 
and instead ran their scrubber for less than 80% of the time, there was a small 
risk that they would be met with a small sanctioning cost. In the group without 
sanctions, around 75% of the managers cooperated, while less than 50% did so 
in the sanctioning group. How did a weak sanction (the risk of an extra cost for 
not running the scrubber) that was intended to increase cooperation actually 
reduce cooperation? The answer is that without a sanction, the decision was 
seen as an ethical one. The right thing to do was to avoid cheating and allocate 
money to running the scrubbers. Once sanctions were introduced, the decision 
was framed as a business decision. Because the sanction costs were so low, and 
there was a cost involved in running the scrubber, costs rather than ethical 
considerations determined the decision. 
Both examples provide evidence that the introduction of financial incentives 
can turn a social dilemma, guided by norms about justice and fairness, into an 
individual dilemma where decisions are based on a business frame and where 
cooperation is determined by a cost-benefit analysis. 
3.3 UNCERTAINTY 
When people act in large-scale dilemmas, their decisions about which course of 
action to take is surrounded by uncertainty. For one thing, people may lack 
knowledge about the problem at hand. In the case of fishing, fishermen may 
not know the size of the fish stock and its rate of replenishment. Another aspect 
of uncertainty relates to the lack of feedback between behaviour and its 
consequences. For example, forestry and farming actors are not directly aware 
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of their contribution to eutrophication in the Baltic Sea. Each type of 
uncertainty can severely affect people’s propensity to cooperate. 
Knowledge and uncertainty  
Values and social norms can have a positive effect on cooperation in social 
dilemmas. However, where values and norms are not mentally activated their 
effect may be small. This mental activation may, in turn, depend on several 
factors. One such factor is a knowledge and understanding of the problem at 
hand. Unless people know about the problem, how can they be expected to 
cooperate in the first place? Such knowledge is provided mainly by natural 
scientists and taken to a wider audience via the media. Still, knowledge is in 
itself not sufficient to induce cooperation. This is due to the fact that 
knowledge is often associated with uncertainty. For example, studies reveal 
that uncertainty about the size of a particular resource is paired with optimism. 
This means that people harvest more than they should (Gustafsson et al., 
1999), resulting in, e.g. over-fishing of a given stock. But even without 
uncertainty, people misbehave. Studies by Robert Gifford (2000, 2007) 
address this issue. Gifford has developed a computer-based fishing game 
where participants can harvest from a stock of fish. Participants in these studies 
are sensitive to the size of the stock. When the stock decreases they adjust their 
catch downwards. Yet, despite the fact that they know about the rate of fish 
regeneration, and the size of the stock after a fishing season (hence no 
uncertainty), they do not adjust sufficiently and the fishery is destroyed over a 
number of fishing seasons. This tendency is much stronger in larger groups, 
(corresponding to a large-scale dilemma) than in smaller groups (equivalent to 
a local dilemma). 
 
 
Are there any fish today? Photo: Shutterstock. 
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Thus, actors must understand that they are part of a social dilemma, and must 
be informed about the state of the resource and how it develops over time. One 
should bear in mind that although knowledge is essential, it does not in itself 
guarantee cooperation. 
Timing of consequences 
Many environmental problems that are characterised by unsustainable 
development are of a global nature. Not only are they social dilemmas but they 
are also large-scale dilemmas. The large scale of the dilemma contributes to 
the inadequate feedback between behaviour and consequences. This in itself 
adds to the uncertainty. This uncertainty can be of both a geographical and a 
temporal nature. The consequences of a specific behaviour in one place may 
turn up elsewhere on Earth. Behaviours here and now may have consequences 
that manifest themselves in the future. John Platt (1973) called the temporal 
aspect of the dilemma a social trap. People enter the social trap by acting upon 
present individual consequences while disregarding future collective consequences. 
They continue on this trajectory and realise too late that there is no point of 
return. According to Platt, an obstacle to changing course is that individual 
consequences here and now are perceived as certain, while future collective 
consequences are uncertain. Why give up personal benefits now in favour of 
uncertain collective benefits in the future? 
  
The consequences of a specific behaviour in one place may turn up elsewhere on 
Earth. Photo: Shutterstock. 
 
The problem of not paying attention to the future has been addressed from 
another point of departure by Yaacov Trope and Nira Liberman (2003; 2010). 
Here, two concepts are of importance: construal level and psychological 
distance. Events may be mentally construed or represented at a low or a high 
level. A low level refers to features that are both concrete and here and now. 
“As a company, we shall reduce our emissions of sulphur by 30%.” A high level 
relates to an abstract and schematic mental construal. “As a company, we shall 
contribute to a better environment.” Psychological distance may refer to time, 
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but also to place and social distance. Events can be perceived as taking place in 
a near or a distal future, near in space or far away (e.g. in another country), 
and concern known or unknown people. These two concepts are related such 
that a small psychological distance (near in time and place, well-known others) 
coincides with a low construal level, while a large distance is associated with a 
high construal level. Moreover, a concrete or low-level construal invites 
thinking in terms of individual consequences, while principles, values and 
norms are linked to an abstract or high-level construal. “Presumably, principles 
more easily apply to the distant future, but as the situation gets closer in time, 
morals and ideologies seem to lose their relevance” (Wakslak et al., 2006, p. 
175). Unfortunately, at least when it comes to environmental dilemmas, 
people have a tendency to concentrate on the here and now. 
Like Trope and Liberman, Platt highlights the difference between behaviours 
that are guided by consequences here and now and behaviours that are guided by 
distant-future choices. These researchers also have in common that they 
postulate that an ethical point of view is more likely to guide distant future 
than near future behavioural choices. However, Platt seems more pessimistic 
when it comes to humans’ ability to apply a distal future perspective. Trope 
and Liberman leave more room for a high mental construal level and 
associated norms and values to guide human behaviour. However, how to 
retain this higher mental level over time is an issue that needs to be addressed. 
3.4. SUMMARY OF EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH  
Social factors influence the mental activation of values and norms. The 
importance of framing was emphasised above. In particular, the difference 
between a market frame and a non-market or social frame has been 
demonstrated in research. A market frame tends to activate thoughts about 
benefits and costs, while a non-market frame is associated with thoughts about 
fairness, justice and what one ought to do. Communication among group 
members is another significant social factor for the activation of values and 
norms. Communication elicits a group identity, which in turn makes the social 
aspects of the situation salient and increases the likelihood that people will 
cooperate for the common good. The importance of temporal construal should 
also be borne in mind. Whereas thinking about incidents in the near future 
tends to elicit more concrete thoughts, often in terms of individual 
consequences, a distal event tends to elicit more abstract and general thoughts 
in terms of values and norms. 
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4. NATURALLY OCCURRING DILEMMAS 
A conflict took place in a mussel-cropping and mussel-fishery in the Wadden 
Sea, a part of the North Sea at the Dutch, German and Danish coast. With 
many fishermen involved, each stakeholder possessed little knowledge about 
how much each and every other fisherman fished. Thus, each fisherman 
continued to fish without restraint, disregarding the aggregated consequences. 
Applying a social dilemma perspective, Beckenkamp (2009) analysed this 
conflict and proposed a solution involving several steps: The first step is to 
identify the relevant stakeholders within the dilemma. Where there are many 
fishermen, they should preferably be divided into subgroups. In a second step, 
the relevant action space of each stakeholder is identified. This action space 
relates to the variation in catch that each fisherman can consider for himself. In 
a third step, the various combinations of action space for each of the 
stakeholders should be presented, and each stakeholder should put them in 
order on the basis of priority. In this way, a better understanding of the 
dilemma at hand is gained through active participation in this game. For 
example, it could be clear that each fisherman prefers to fish too much, or that 
some show restraint while others over-fish.  
 
 
The Wadden Sea, marked with middle blue colour. Map from Wikipedia, modified. 
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Knowledge and understanding 
As was pointed out above in the context of the conditions needed to balance 
social dilemmas, the actors involved must have a knowledge and 
understanding of the dilemma at hand. Still, knowledge and understanding 
alone will not result in a stable solution. A report on the red snapper fishery of 
the Gulf of Mexico, an ocean basin bordered by the United States, Mexico and 
Cuba (MRAG, 1997), hints at why this could be the case. Red snappers are 
severely overfished in the Gulf. Bycatch by shrimpers was identified as the 
single most important cause. More fish than shrimps were caught, and dead 
fish were thrown back into the ocean. Regulations were proposed, but even 
though shrimpers were aware that these would help to stop the problem of 
overfishing, they resented control and regulation. Presumably, egoistic 
incentives associated with the profits they made on the shrimps loomed larger 
than collective interests. If people are to voluntarily stand up for the common 
good, the costs or efforts must not be perceived as too high (see also Diekmann 
& Preisendoerfer, 2003).  
 
 
Fish discard in the sea. Photo: YouTube/Fish Fight. 
 
Control and sanctions 
But even if stakeholders could agree on refraining from over-harvesting, the 
situation is extremely reactive to defection by some of the group members. 
Control and sanctions may be called for, and should be easier to accept if a 
knowledge and understanding of the dilemma have been provided 
(Beckenkamp, 2009). Through control and sanctions, the responsible 
institution signals what society expects from each fisherman, but also what 
each fisherman can expect others to do, i.e. the institution emphasises the 
importance of social norms. 
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Research on justice has addressed the issue of sanctions in social dilemmas. An 
interesting theory has been presented by Schroeder et al. (2008). The theory 
makes a distinction between restorative and retributive justice. The authors 
argue that a small amount of disobedience should be tolerated. This means 
that sanctions should not be too harsh after only one transgression. Instead, 
the goal should be to make restitution to victims and to restore social order. It 
should signal that the behaviour was wrong, but be forgiving3. In other words, 
it should appeal to the conscience of the transgressor. If, for example, a 
wastewater plant exceeds its limits for discharges once, a warning could be an 
appropriate signal. However, consistent defection should not be tolerated. 
Such behaviour calls for retributive justice, for example in the form of 
substantial fines. Retributive justice does not only concern punishment. It also 
reasserts the importance of group values and social norms. Other group 
members make it clear that reiterated, and presumably intentional, defection 
will not be tolerated. 
4.1 CONDITIONS FOR GOVERNING THE COMMONS 
As Hardin assumed that every individual pursues only his or her own interests, 
his solution to the social dilemma includes “mutual coercion mutually agreed 
upon” (1968, p. 1247). Each stakeholder has to give away the free right to the 
common and allow constraints or coercion from an authoritarian government. 
Dawes (1980) argued against coercion as a standard solution to social 
dilemmas, and so did Ostrom (1990). Her studies show that many commons 
have been managed without coercion by authorities. Rather, social norms have 
been the cement that unites people and invokes cooperation. Ostrom (1998) 
emphasised the importance of the norm of reciprocity. For the norm of 
reciprocity to be salient, certain conditions should be fulfilled. People should 
have the opportunity to identify who else is involved, assess the likelihood that 
others are cooperators, cooperate on the basis that others can be trusted to 
cooperate, refuse to cooperate with those who do not reciprocate, and punish 
those who betray trust. In local communities where the same people interact 
over extended periods, social bonds and a common social identity grow 
stronger. 
  
                                                
 
3 Support for the importance of initial forgiveness can also be found in Axelrod (1984). 
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This does not imply that governance of the commons is unnecessary. The 
commons must be governed, and (at least for local common pool resources) 
preferably by the stakeholders themselves, see condition 3 below. Examples of 
local common pool resources are irrigation systems and coastal fisheries. To 
achieve effective governance, certain conditions have been shown to facilitate 
control (Dietz et al., 2003, p. 1909): 
1. The resources and the use of resources by humans can be monitored, 
and the information can be verified and understood at a relatively low 
cost …  
2. Rates of change in resources, resource-user populations, technology, 
and economic and social conditions are moderate.  
3. Communities maintain frequent face-to-face communication and dense 
social networks … that increase the potential for trust, allow people to 
express and see emotional reactions to distrust, and lower the cost of 
monitoring behaviour and inducing rule compliance.  
4. Outsiders can be excluded at a relatively low cost from using the 
resource…  
5. Users support effective monitoring and rule enforcement. 
These conditions apply more easily to local than to large-scale dilemmas. The 
challenge is to devise institutional arrangements for larger-scale dilemmas that 
help to meet these criteria (see also McGinnis & Ostrom, 2008). Some 
governance requirements for large-scale dilemmas have been suggested (Dietz 
et al., ibid.):  
1. Providing information about the state of the environment and human 
actions, along with information about uncertainty4 and values (market 
value as well as other values that are even harder to capture, e.g. the 
value of biodiversity).  
                                                
 
4 Uncertainty is inherent in social dilemmas. This concerns environmental uncertainty (resource 
size and variation) as well as social uncertainty (behaviour of other stakeholders) (see Biel & 
Gärling, 1995). Strangely enough, aggregated data that usually contribute to validity may 
counteract valid knowledge. Dietz et al. mention the northern cod, where estimates by fishery 
scientists indicated that the stocks were rebuilding, so generous catch limits were established. 
Unfortunately, this policy was based on aggregated data for the total cod stock and disregarded 
several other important issues. For example, failure to consider that there were distinct 
populations with different characteristics and that coastal fishery landed smaller cod, thereby 
undermining the total stock. The lesson to learn from this example is to bear in mind what the 
relevant population is when attempting to reduce environmental uncertainty. 
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2. Establishing procedures for dealing with conflicts between 
stakeholders.  
3. Inducing rule compliance by establishing governance instruments (see 
above on restorative and retributive justice).  
4. Providing infrastructure (physical and technological). 
5. Being prepared for change.  
The first requirement originates from the need to provide knowledge and 
understanding about the dilemma. The second and third requirements both 
concern the importance of a formal structure to handle potential conflicts 
between groups of stakeholders. The next requirement addresses the need for 
financial capital to monitor resource use and the behaviour of human users, 
along with providing technologies that obstruct the exploitation of the 
commons. The fifth requirement recognises that things do change and that 
institutions must be designed to allow for changes, for example in terms of 
which rules to apply or which policy measures to use. 
Finally, the authors also suggest some principles for the robust governance of 
environmental resources on a larger scale. These principles are analytic 
deliberation, nesting and institutional variety. It is important that resource-
users, interested members of the public and scientists all are involved in a well-
structured dialogue about the resource. The suggestion by Beckenkamp that 
knowledge and understanding are important is in line with this principle. 
Moreover, since governance is not exerted by one “level” alone, institutional 
arrangements for governance must be nested in many layers. As for the Baltic 
Sea, local levels or municipalities can be represented at national level, at 
national levels within HELCOM, and in HELCOM and other commissions and 
organisations within the EU. Furthermore, not all institutions are public sector. 
Market-based institutions must also be included, creating a variety of 
institutional types.  
4.2 COMMUNITY-BASED MANAGEMENT REGIMES VERSUS PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 
Rose (2002) contrasted Hardin’s solution to governing the commons with the 
solution supported by Ostrom´s research. According to Hardin (1968), the 
commons could either be privatised or be governed by authorities. In line with 
Hardin’s solution, Tradable Environmental Allowances (TEAs) can be used 
based on private ownership. The present European carbon emission trading 
scheme provides a good example of a TEA. Ostrom has shown that 
management of common pool resources (CPR) can be undertaken at local level 
on a voluntary basis by a demarcated group of users. Rose called this a 
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Community-Based Management Regime (CBMR) for common property 
resources, which is perhaps a more encompassing term. In particular, Rose 
compared TEAs with CBMRs.  
CBMRs and TEAs have in common that they both relate to property ownership. 
In CBMRs the property is common; in TEAs it is privately owned. In neither 
case is the resource open for all to use. Of more interest is perhaps what these 
regimes fail to share. Some distinctive characteristics between TEAs and 
CBMRs are mentioned by Rose: (i) In TEA regimes permissible usage is 
negotiated between legislators and the public. In CBMRs the entitled collective 
develops its own practice; (ii) In TEA regimes, regulatory bodies allocate 
allowances to individual holders who can trade these allowances among 
themselves. In CBMRs, community norms often form the basis for individual 
allowances and trading is rare. The importance of practice in developing 
CBMRs is most likely linked to the fact that they have a long duration, while a 
TEA regime is a relatively new form of governance.  
Certain resource characteristics or conditions may favour one or other of the 
two regimes. Rose mentions three characteristics that could result in different 
strengths and weaknesses: resource size, resource complexity and commerce 
in resources.  
Resource size 
CBMRs often encompass a local and restricted resource. Local actors can 
monitor each other’s behaviour, and there is room for the establishment of 
norms and horizontal trust (trust among users). Should the same group of 
actors manage a large-scale resource, social norms may not be there to guide 
action. Rose takes nineteenth-century whalers as an example. Crews often 
came from the same towns, where common social norms and customs had 
developed. At sea they cooperated in capturing whales. However, no norms 
ever developed that would regulate the total catch of various types of whale, 
resulting in the decimation of stocks. Long-term governance that resided in the 
local community was absent. Norms that governed practice at home were not 
transferred to the new, large-scale environment. Moreover, the problem of 
monitoring resource-size augmented. 
TEAs seems better adapted to large-scale dilemmas. As TEAs are formally 
structured by governments, they may be easier to encompass within 
intergovernmental agreements. Moreover, efficient trading requires a thick 
market. A thick market includes a high number of buyers and sellers. As a 
result, many transactions take place and prices become less volatile and assets 
more solid. There are more potential traders for large-scale than small-scale 
resources. Where trust is established, it is trust between regulators and the 
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public. Important criteria are whether allowances are fairly allocated and that 
monitoring allows control of the targeted problem, such as pollutants. 
Resource complexity 
This concerns the level of use, the total amount of harvest or the cap on any 
given environmental resource, for example a fish stock. Should the yield be set 
in line with a maximum amount, bearing in mind that the resource must not be 
endangered? Or should the yield be related to an economic goal such as the 
difference between revenues and the costs of extraction? Since many factors 
other than direct size of catches affect resource size, both solutions may run 
into problems. 
In practice, total caps based on an economic model are seldom used under 
TEAs. Rather, a cap based on historic practice, for example levels of carbon 
dioxide pollutants, has been used as a benchmark. This may match perceptions 
of fairness, and facilitate introduction. At the same time, this solution may face 
opposition when the total cap is to be reduced (cf. the European carbon 
emission trading scheme). In fishing, a precise measure of a particular species 
has sometimes been used. The risk here is that fishermen catch more than their 
allowances permit, and that this is very difficult to monitor. Since larger 
species are more profitable than smaller ones, smaller specimens may be 
thrown back into the sea. The same could be true for bycatch. In CBMRs the 
responsiveness to variations in the size of the resource is greater. This is true in 
particular for resources that are stationary and possible to monitor.  
Commerce in resources 
CBMRs are less sensitive to natural resource variations but more sensitive to 
changes in commercial pressure. When a sudden demand for the resource 
from the outside appears, for example for ivory or fish, norms for handling the 
temptation for individual gain are not in place. Within TEAs, there is an 
immediate response to variations in demand through the price mechanism. 
Should CBMRs be exposed to such temptations, authorities should consider 
regulations and assistance to the local community. 
Finally, Rose acknowledged that community resource management is 
intertwined with human rights concerns. Community management practices 
are often established by traditional peoples. Hence, to recognize CBMRs and to 
allocate property rights to the participants is not only a way of regulating the 
commons; it is also a means of honouring human rights. 
4.3 STRATEGIES TO PROMOTE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
In a similar vein as Rose, van Vugt has identified four strategies to promote 
successful resource management: information, identity, institutions and 
COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT: LESSONS FROM SOCIAL DILEMMA RESEARCH 
 
 
30 
incentives (van Vugt, 2010). Incentives, and in particular economic incentives 
as they are treated by van Vugt, have been covered above under Framing (see 
page 16 under Framing). The other three strategies are discussed below. 
Information 
Among other things information can contribute to reducing uncertainty. This 
goes for environmental uncertainty, i.e. uncertainty surrounding the size of a 
resource and how it changes, as well as for social uncertainty or how others use 
the resource (Biel & Gärling, 1995). With regard to environmental uncertainty, 
people are generally over-optimistic about the size of the resource, which in 
turn may cause overuse of the resource (Gustafsson et al., 1999; Gärling et al., 
1998). Social uncertainty is closely linked to trust, since people in large-scale 
dilemmas lack information about the behaviour of others. Reducing 
environmental uncertainty about a resource, for example a fish stock, requires 
reliable information about the size of the stock and its rate of replenishment. 
The reduction of social uncertainty requires information about others’ 
harvesting behaviour. Where many others cooperate, or where reliable trend 
data indicate that many others have converted from defection to cooperation, 
social uncertainty is reduced and trust is established (Klandermans, 1992). An 
important ingredient with regard to information about both kinds of 
uncertainty is that people have trust in the messenger. 
The importance of trust was pointed out by Palmer (1991a) in his study of 
mussel fishery in Maine. An authority had the right to ban mussel-harvesting if 
the mussels carried a disease and human health was threatened. The authority 
undertook testing. However, the test results were kept secret and when the 
authority ordered the cessation of fishing, trust between the authority and the 
fishermen was undermined. 
It is also worth mentioning that the degree of cooperation depends on the 
causes that people attribute to a threat against a resource. When the authority 
proclaimed the mussel embargo, fishermen perhaps suspected that the 
authority had a motive other than promoting health and did not realise that 
natural causes, a disease, could have triggered the ban. 
Identity 
Experimental research shows that where people feel attached to other 
stakeholders and share a social identity, they are more inclined to cooperate 
and protect the environment (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Orbell et al., 1988; van 
Vugt, 2001). One reason is that they have trust in others to cooperate. A 
second motive is that they contribute to group interests. An elegant study of 
lobster fishery by fishermen from two ports in Maine (Palmer 1991b) confirms 
these findings from experimental research. Palmer showed that fishermen 
from the port with stronger social bonds than those from the port with weaker 
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bonds exchanged far more information (via an open radio network between 
vessels) about the location and supply of lobsters. A sensible explanation of this 
difference is that social networks breed trust, and social norms develop with 
regard to the exchange of information – norms that endure. As a result, 
knowledge about the extent and size of the stock increased. Where ties were 
weaker, each crew had only knowledge about its own catches.  
Institutions 
The importance of trust for cooperation was emphasised above. Those who 
draw upon a resource must rely upon others not to exploit it (horizontal trust). 
From time to time authorities step in to regulate the use of resources. It is then 
of utmost importance that stakeholders can trust the authorities (vertical trust) 
to apply transparent and fair procedures (Lind & Taylor, 1997). This is true for 
both small-scale dilemmas, such as the regulation of fishery in local waters, 
and large-scale dilemmas, such as the reduction of e.g. nutrient discharges 
from agriculture into the Baltic Sea. 
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5. EXPERIMENTAL AND FIELD RESEARCH:  
A COMPARISON 
Some findings from experimental and field research overlap. Both emphasise 
the importance of information to stakeholders about the nature of the dilemma. 
Information should be disseminated to politicians, authorities and anyone 
involved in the dilemma. There is also an agreement that information about 
the state of the resource and the behaviour of resource-users is essential. The 
former reduces resource uncertainty, while the latter reduces social 
uncertainty. Another component that the two kinds of research spell out as 
important to induce cooperation is social norms, in their descriptive as well as 
in their prescriptive form. Descriptive norms spell out what people do. Hence, 
descriptive norms coincide with the reduction of social uncertainty. Prescriptive 
norms signal what people ought to do in a particular situation. They are moral 
in nature and situate behaviour in a social dilemma in the moral sphere. 
Both areas of research also underline the importance of trust. Experimental 
research has targeted mainly horizontal trust, while research on natural 
environmental dilemmas also underscores the importance of vertical trust 
(between authorities and actors). In the laboratory, the significance of group 
cohesion, or sometimes group conflict (see Bornstein, 2003), for cooperation 
has to a large extent guided research. In the natural environment, as compared 
with the laboratory, it is evident that many interest groups are involved in 
using, as well as governing, the dilemma. Hence, the nested and hierarchical 
nature of the dilemma becomes salient. A particular aspect of vertical trust 
focused on is trust in regulators, and the importance of fair and transparent 
procedures.  
Experimental research has, to a greater extent, highlighted the importance of 
values and of framing. Framing affects how the dilemma is perceived, and 
which criteria guide human evaluation and behaviour. If the dilemma is 
embedded in a social context, social norms, values, and trust come into play. 
However, if it is embedded in an individual context, benefits and drawbacks for 
the individual become salient. 
Finally, one should bear in mind that this comparison builds on a thin layer of 
research on real-world environmental dilemmas. In addition, far too little 
attention has been paid to the time dimension in both strands of research. 
Research, has largely ignored the fact that the environmental consequences of 
actions in the present often manifest themselves in the future, as have policy 
makers. Since actors lack feedback on their behaviour, they can ignore the fact 
that they contribute to environmental degradation.  
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6. CONCLUSIONS OF THE SCIENTIFIC REVIEW 
When it comes to the marine environment and dilemmas, research has 
targeted mainly fishery. Less attention has been paid to other problems, such 
as eutrophication or chemicals. Why this is the case is unclear. Perhaps fishery 
is perceived as a natural “ingredient” of the marine environment, while 
eutrophication and chemicals are associated with land-based activities. In the 
former case, there is a direct link between activities at sea and marine 
consequences. Moreover, in the latter case there is a time delay between 
activities on land and consequences in the sea. The more complex structure 
surrounding eutrophication could compound this in that more actors are 
involved. Whatever the case, more research is called for if we are to gain a 
better understanding of how to counter eutrophication and the discharge of 
chemicals into the sea. However, as these problems involve stakeholders other 
than fishery, and are embedded in different hierarchies, the findings from the 
research on fishery may not transfer to other domains. 
 
 
It is not only fish harvesting that is important for the marine environment. There is 
also an impact from using resources for the production and consumption of other 
food, as meat and vegetables. Photo: Shutterstock. 
 
Evidently, social norms are important in establishing appropriate 
environmental behaviour. One should bear in mind though that social norms 
come in different shapes and guises. In local communities, where the same 
people interact repeatedly, social bonds and a common social identity grow 
stronger. Not only can co-operators and defectors be identified, trust among 
residents also enables norms like the norm of reciprocity to develop. This is 
partly due to the fact that well managed local resources are mostly community-
based, are not open to the world, and are of long duration.  
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In environmental settings where people cannot observe the behaviour of 
others, general benevolence norms, or what people ought to do in a particular 
situation, could be activated and could promote cooperation (Biel & 
Thøgersen, 2007). This applies mainly to large-scale dilemmas. In particular, 
people with stronger environmental values are likely to be guided by such 
prescriptive norms. However, even among people with stronger values, these 
are not chronically accessible. People do not always perceive that their 
behaviour contributes to the dilemma. One reason could be that they lack 
knowledge about certain environmental problems and how human behaviour 
contributes to negative effects. Issue entrepreneurs need to inform the public 
about existing environmental problems. In addition, procedural information 
about alternative behaviours and how to go about performing these should 
also be communicated (Dahlstrand & Biel, 1997). 
Despite the fact that people are informed, prescribe to environmental values, 
understand the dilemma structure of the problem and realise that they have a 
responsibility to contribute to its solution, they may still not cooperate. 
Cooperation comes at a cost and even if people understand what must be done, 
it could be seen as too costly. This is where policy must step in. However, in 
order for a policy to be successful, politicians and authorities must be trusted to 
act for the common good, act on the basis of stated intentions and ensure that 
people behave in line with regulations. 
Information about environmental consequences is also an important issue, as 
is how it is communicated. Sustainable development is a concept that has 
attracted widespread attention over recent decades. Perhaps unsustainable 
development would be a better target: to plan for what should be avoided 
rather than approached. Eight of the Ten Commandments in Exodus prescribe 
what should not be done. In natural sciences, sustainable development has 
been defined in the negative (see Holmberg et al., 1996) and in terms of what 
nature should not be exposed to. According to Holmberg, the general 
principles for a sustainable society state that substances extracted from the 
lithosphere (the solid part of the Earth) must not systematically accumulate in 
the ecosphere (the part of the atmosphere in which it is possible to breathe), 
society-produced substances must not systematically accumulate in the 
ecosphere, and the physical conditions for production and diversity within the 
ecosphere must not systematically be undermined. Moreover, psychological 
research shows that negative information draws more attention than positive 
(Fiske, 1980). People are more prepared to avoid a product that is harmful to 
the environment than to choose a similar product that is beneficial to the 
environment (Grankvist et al., 2004). In the finance industry, institutional 
investors apply “negative screening”, implying that they avoid companies in 
their portfolio that are judged to be negative in terms of ethical or 
environmental criteria. However, “positive screening” based on the same 
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criteria but with a positive evaluation, is rarely applied (Hedesström et al., 
2011). In the moral sphere, it could be the case that a specification of what one 
should not do is in most instances more precise, and a better guideline for 
evaluation and action, than a specification of what one should do. For 
example, it could be an efficient strategy to define policies in terms of actions 
that contribute to the degradation rather than the improvement of the 
environment. Actors may be unwilling to improve the environmental status, 
but resent being known as the ones that damage it. 
An additional factor that may conceal the dilemma relates to framing effects 
and incentives associated with behaviour. In particular, economic incentives 
have been shown to promote an individual perspective and a focus on private 
rather than collective consequences. Where people consider an issue moral, and 
economic incentives are introduced to influence behaviour, moral motivation 
is crowded out (Frey, 1997). And once moral motivation has been crowded 
out, social norms, trust and values no longer guide valuations and behaviour. 
Moreover, actors concentrate on benefits and drawbacks in the short run and 
disregard time-lagged consequences. Hence, the time frame for valuation 
shrinks. A social dilemma is turned into an individual dilemma, leaving 
concerns about the environment and other people behind. As an example, 
farmers could find it profitable to increase their use of nitrogen fertiliser as 
they will produce more at a lower cost. However, such use often results in time-
lagged eutrophication in rivers and seas, which are consequences that accrue 
to society as a whole. Here, structural changes in the form of new policy 
measures may be required. 
The dilemma may also be concealed by the fact that people often focus on the 
near future rather than the distal future. Hence, they think in terms of 
individual consequences rather than in terms of values and norms. Admittedly, 
one should expect that people stick to a distant-future perspective, associated 
with thoughts about values and norms, for a longer time period. However, it 
could be vital that such a perspective is introduced in a decision process. 
International negotiations around a common good, such as clean seas, could 
be a good example. To the extent that each country comes with its own agenda, 
and discussions start with the presentation of these agendas, negotiations are 
anchored in the pros and cons for each country. The frame changes if thoughts 
about the common good and how to preserve it for future generations are used 
as a starting point for negotiations. In the latter case, it would be easier to 
anchor in shared responsibility for, and commitment to, what ought to be 
done. 
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7. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR REDUCING 
EUTROPHICATION IN THE BALTIC SEA 
It has been established that the eutrophication status of the Baltic Sea is 
troublesome. As the input of nutrients to the sea has its origin in society, the 
Ministers of the Baltic Sea States declared in 1988 that nutrient discharges 
should be reduced by 50% between the late 1980s and 1995. Knowledge about 
which sectors and activities contribute to nutrient inputs is available. HELCOM 
and various directives have identified arable land, livestock production, 
shipping and wastewater treatment as important degrading sources. In their 
fourth pollution load compilation, HELCOM (2004) also identified forestry as 
a main source of losses of nitrogen and phosphorus (also briefly mentioned in 
HELCOM, 2011). With the exception of forestry, these sectors have been 
addressed in the thematic assessment of the effects of nutrient enrichment in 
the Baltic Sea region (HELCOM, 2009). Despite national programmes in each 
country around the Baltic Sea to reduce nutrient loads, the situation is far from 
satisfactory. This should perhaps come as no surprise. The Baltic Sea Action 
Plan (HELCOM, 2007) was adopted as recently as 2007. New measures take 
time to implement and inputs of nutrients will continue in the interim. 
Moreover, to get all parties on board, elements of the measures negotiated and 
introduced in each country are voluntary, albeit commitments are entered into 
at the Ministerial level. On the positive side, voluntary agreements increase 
commitment as they are viewed as internally motivated and not enforced. On 
the negative side, voluntary agreements can have a negative impact on 
accomplishment. Although the 1988 Ministerial Declaration stated that 
nutrient discharges should be reduced by 50% between late 1988 and 1995, by 
2006 phosphorus reduction stood at 45%, while nitrogen reduction was just 
30%. In particular, reduction targets for agriculture had not been fulfilled. 
The potentially negative aspects of voluntary procedures may be related to how 
policy instruments and declarations are shaped. There are several European 
policies addressing water quality. Some legally-binding directives (e.g. the 
Urban Waste Water Directive and the Nitrates Directive) leave room for 
national choices. Each member state can either declare the whole country as a 
sensitive area/vulnerable zone or designate sensitive areas/vulnerable zones. 
In the former case, the provisions of the directive relating to sensitive 
areas/vulnerable zones must be implemented for the whole country. In the 
latter, the implementation is restricted to the designated areas/zones only. In 
addition, monitoring and assessment are left to the member state to control. 
The implementation of the Baltic Sea Action Plan has been agreed upon by the 
contracting states. HELCOM, in turn, is responsible for assessing its 
implementation. So far, national implementation has been seriously delayed, 
and reporting to HELCOM about measures taken is inadequate (WWF, 2013). 
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As HELCOM does not have any binding authority, voluntary implementation 
may account for the lack of progress.  
To avoid a lack of commitment both to marine action plans and to a means of 
carrying them out, some recommendations based on previous scientific 
reviews and conclusions for promoting cooperation to the benefit of the Baltic 
Sea are proposed. 
• Knowledge about causes as well as consequences of nutrient 
discharges in the Baltic Sea is essential to improve its present 
condition. The main sources of nitrogen and phosphorus have been 
identified. Consequences of eutrophication are well known. Collection 
of additional information is costly, and economic resources are scarce, 
decisions must be taken about when sufficient information has been 
collected to exert pressure on main sectors or sources causing 
eutrophication. As the knowledge situation the now stands, more 
emphasis could be put on implementing actions already agreed upon 
on at the expense of developing new eutrophication indicators and 
indicator-based assessments. Thus, national authorities and regional 
bodies should enforce the implementation of actions already agreed 
upon by concentrating on curtailing activities that are the sources of 
nutrient loads. 
• Vertical trust. Having said that, actors must be informed about why 
they should change their behaviour, and they must also trust policy 
makers and regulators. Information about reasons for change includes 
the present and anticipated future state of the Baltic Sea, and how it is 
affected by activities in various sectors. The work by HELCOM has 
established a common ground for factual knowledge about the state of 
the Baltic Sea. To further support vertical trust, make sure that all 
relevant parties are involved in the process that results in policies that 
aim to regulate behaviour. Involvement entails face-to-face 
communication and the establishment of social networks. This process 
also increases accountability as parties make commitments along the 
way. The parties involved also get to learn about the various 
perspectives and interests that are represented. With increasing 
vertical trust, the risk of having to deal with conflicts will decrease. 
Nevertheless, conflicts will probably arise and resolving disputes in 
negotiations, where HELCOM can have an empowering role, could be 
a fruitful governance approach.  
• Horizontal trust. Involved parties must also trust in other actors’ 
willingness to cooperate for the common good, i.e. horizontal trust 
must also be established. Just as the involvement of all parties can 
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breed vertical trust, it can also breed horizontal trust. There is a 
potential risk though that distrust is maintained if suspicion arises that 
a country avoids reporting on, or leaves out, implementations that 
should have been made. Moreover, injustice may be perceived should 
one country declare the whole country a sensitive area while another 
country selects only certain areas as being sensitive. If parties are not 
committed to cooperation for the common good, defection by one 
party in a social dilemma signals that others can follow suit. To reduce 
this risk, the reporting process for the implementation of the BSAP 
should be strengthened. Where rules are violated, sanctions should 
not be too harsh after a first transgression: they should signal that the 
behaviour was wrong, but show forgiveness (restorative justice). 
Consistent violation should not be tolerated however, and sanctions 
should be harder in a bid to reassert the importance of group values 
and social norms (retributive justice).  
• Framing. Finally, the framing of policy issues is important. In 
negotiations, try to anchor on a common and desirable future state for 
the Baltic Sea. In the first instance, avoid presenting reduction targets 
for each country. The risk one runs is that parties in the negotiation 
focus on what is feasible in the short run for “our country” rather than 
what is desirable in the longer term to manage the common good. In a 
second step, agreements about improvements that must be made and 
commitments to strategies that need to be in place in order to reach a 
desirable state should be established before more detailed plans and 
policy measures are negotiated. Market-based measures might be one 
approach to managing shared resources, but they require careful 
consideration. Regional trading with nutrients (HELCOM, 2009) has 
been suggested. However, the present European emission trading 
scheme for carbon, expected to secure cost-effectiveness, leaves a 
great deal to be desired. Hence, a trading system may not contribute 
to its prime goal of being cost-effective. In addition, trading turns the 
focus away from the common good and instead onto financial gains 
and losses. Where involved countries have an understanding of what 
ought to be done, there is an obvious risk that they might lose sight of 
the common good.  
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